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Linkages between Investment Flows and Financial Development: Causality 
Evidence from Selected African Countries
Abstract
This paper introduces previously missing financial components(efficiency, activity and 
size)  in  the  assessment  of  the  finance-investment  nexus.  Using  VAR  models   in  the 
perspectives of VECM and short-run Granger causality, three broad findings are established: 
(1) while finance led investment elasticities are positive, investment elasticities of finance are 
negative;  (2)but  for  Guinea  Bissau,  Mozambique  and  Togo,  finance  does  not  seem  to 
engender  portfolio  investment;  (3)contrary  to  mainstream  literature,  financial  efficiency 
appears  to  impact  investment  more  than  financial  depth.  Four  policy  implications  result: 
(1)extreme caution is needed in the use of single  equation analysis for economic forecasts; 
(2)financial  development  leads  more  to  investment  flows  than  the  other  way  round;  (3) 
financial allocation efficiency is more relevant as means to attracting investment flows than 
financial  depth;  (4)  the  somewhat  heterogeneous  character  of  the  findings  also  point  to 
shortcomings  in  blanket  policies  that  are  not  contingent  on country-specific  trends  in  the 
finance-investment nexus. 
JEL Classification: C40; C50; F21; O10; O55 
Key words: Financial development; Investment; Causality; Africa 
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1. Introduction
Investment  flow  is  an  essential  pre-requisite  to  triggering  economic  dynamism, 
enhancing  productivity,  diffusing  new  industrial  technologies,  contributing  to 
entrepreneurship development, maintaining competitiveness and reducing poverty(Misati & 
Nyamongo,2010).  Thus  investment  flows  are  crucial  in  stimulating  growth,  revenue  to 
improve public services and employment to lift people out of poverty. However the degree to 
which investment contributes to growth and poverty alleviation depends on the its ability to 
gain access to financial  services.  The financial  sector  in most  African countries  has been 
rapidly developing particularly in the 1990s when these economies adopted financial sector 
reforms(Misati & Nyamongo,2010). Growth in the financial sectors have been complemented 
with the dynamism of the Information and Communication Technology(ICT) sector. Whether 
these developments  in the financial  sector  contribute in  any way to growth in  investment 
flows is  an empirical  question.  It  is  also interesting not to undermine  a  reverse-effect,  as 
investment  flows  could  also  have  a  significant  incidence  on  financial  intermediary 
development dynamics. 
Both  theoretical  and  empirical  literature  have  substantially  established  linkages 
between investment and financial development(Rousseau,1999; Xu,2000; Ndikumana,2000; 
Rousseau  & Vuthipadadorn,2005;  Love  & Zichinno,2006;  Forssbaeck  &  Oxelheim,2008; 
Landon & Smith,2009; Misati & Nyamongo,2010; Forbes, 2010; Afangideh,2010). However 
most  of the available  evidence  on this  area of  research has to  a  large extent  ignored the 
dynamics  of  financial  development.  In  a  substantial  bulk  of  the  literature,  financial 
development has been equated to one particular aspect of the phenomenon: financial depth or 
money  supply.  For  instance,  it  will  be  misleading  to  equate  a  positive  ‘liquid 
liability’-‘foreign  investment’  nexus  to  a  positive  ‘financial  development’-  ‘foreign 
investment’ nexus.  This study completes existing literature by assessing linkages between 
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investment flows and financial development dynamics from a multidimensional framework. 
This assessment is important because theory does not provide clear predictions on the sign of 
the  relationship  between  financial  development  and  investment.  While  some  studies  find 
support for the McKinnon(1973) and Shaw(1973) proposition which identifies a positive link 
from financial deepening to investment, others state that this link remains unclear(Misati & 
Nyamongo,2010, 5). More so a great chunk of studies in this area are mainly focused on high 
and middle-income countries  with  little  reference  to  African  economies.  The few studies 
focusing on Africa do not fully exploit the plethora of investment and financial development 
indicators available(Ndikumana,2000; Misati & Nyamongo,2010; Afangideh,2010). 
This  paper’s  contribution  to  existing  literature  is  fivefold.  (1)  Contrary  to  the 
mainstream approach we use  four  measures  of  financial  intermediary  development(depth, 
efficiency,  activity and size)  as well as four types of investment flows(domestic,  foreign, 
portfolio and total). Hence we broaden the scope of the investment-finance nexus. (2) The 
chosen investment and financial indicators result from the broadest macroeconomic dataset 
available on investment and financial intermediary flows. Thus based on correlation analyses, 
conceptual  frameworks  and  usages  in  the  literature,  these  selected  indicators  are  most 
representative  of  investment   and financial  flows in  the  African  continent.  (3)   Usage of 
optimally  specified  econometric  methods  in  contradiction  to  purely  discretionary  model 
specifications   in  mainstream  literature.  (4)  Distinction  between  short-run  and  long-term 
effects for each investment-finance pair. (5) Based on  the findings, we provide the much 
needed policy recommendations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews existing literature.  
Data and preliminary tests for model specification are discussed and reported respectively in 
Section 3. Empirical analysis is covered in Section 4. Section 5 discusses empirical results 
while Section 6 concludes.
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2. Existing literature 
Literature  on  causality  is  inundated  with  empirical  findings  on  the  finance-growth 
nexus for developing countries.  Literature pertaining to the assessment of this relationship 
could be classified into three main strands: proponents of  ‘finance-led-growth’, advocates of 
‘growth-led-finance’  and  the  bi-directional  causality  school  of  thought.  Studies  consistent 
with  the  thesis  on  ‘finance-cause-growth’  include,  among  others:  Jung(1986),  King  & 
Levine(1993),  De Ahmed  & Ansari(1998),  Darrat(1999),  Christopoulos  & Tsionas(2004), 
Ghali(1999), Xu(2000), Jalilian & Kirkpatrick(2002) ,Calderon & Lin(2003) and Hibibullah 
&  End(2006).   However  works  suggesting  an  anti-thesis(growth  cause  finance)  are 
fewer(Agbetsiafa,  2003; Odhiambo,  2004,2008); while  those positioning with  a synthesis 
(finance cause growth and vice-versa) are much preponderant(Demetriades & Hussein,1996; 
Akinboade,  1998;  Luintel  &  Khan,  1999;  Al-Youssif,  2002;  Calderon  &  Liu,  2003; 
Odhiambo;2005).  While this conflicting literature on the finance-growth nexus is abundant, 
the  finance-investment  nexus  has  received  less  scholarly  attention,  especially  for  African 
countries(Misati & Nyamongo,2010). 
Table 1 below summarizes existing empirical evidence on the conflicts in the literature 
for the investment-finance nexus. While there are many studies which conclude on a  finance-
cause-investment  nexus(Rousseau,1999;  Ndikumana,2000;  Xu,2000;  Ndikumana,2005; 
Forbes,2010), there are very few on bidirectional causality(Huang,2006). Despite a thorough 
search we find no studies on an ‘investment-led-finance’ nexus, which further lends credit to 
the motivations of the paper. In the last column of the table, we present concerns that could 
motivate further research on the linkage.
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Table 1:  Selected empirical findings on the finance-investment nexus 
Author(s) Countries/Regions Direction of 
causality/relation
Resulting basis for our 
research
A)Studies consistent with finance led investment
Rousseau(1999) Japan Finance led Investment
(Financial reforms taking 
between 1868-1884 led to 
raising investment between 
1880 and 1913.)
Could financial reforms and 
development also raise the 
African continent to investment 
prominence in the 21st century?
Ndikumana(2000) 30 sub-Saharan African 
countries
Investment is endogenous to 
finance.
Study is not causality-oriented
Xu(2000) 41 developing countries Finance led Investment M2 is the main measure of F.D
Ndikumana(2005) 99 countries (  developing 
and developed)
F.D led Domestic Investment What about exclusively under- 
developed countries for the most 
part?
Rousseau and Vuthipadadorn (2005) 10 Asian economies Finance led investment
(M1 and (M2-M1)) lead to 
Gross fixed domestic investment
Only M1, (M2-M1) and Gross 
domestic fixed investments are 
used as variables. 
Love and Zichinno(2006) 36 developed countries(8000 
firms)
Finance led Investment Could the finance-led-
investment nexus be same in 
Africa?
Forssbaeck and Oxelheim(2008) 1379 European non-financial 
firms
Finance led Foreign Direct 
Investment.
Could  these  results be 
reflected to African countries?
Landon and Smith(2009) Panel of  17 OCED countries Currency depreciation 
negatively granger cause 
investment(aggregate and sector 
level investments)
Restricted measure of Financial 
development
Forbes(2010) U.S.A F.D  attract Foreign investment Could F.D in Africa solve 
certain global imbalances with 
investment (trade imbalances 
like the case of U.S.A?
Misati and Nyamongo(2010) 18 sub-Saharan African 
countries
Savings affect private 
investment  negatively
M2 increase savings in certain 
African countries(e.g. 
Malaysia).Does this imply M2 
decrease F.D for other 
countries?
Afangideh(2010) Nigeria F.D leads to Agricultural 
investment
Arbitrary choice of lags for 
VAR specifications.
B) Studies consistent with investment led finance
No studies found  
C) Studies consistent with bi-directional causality
Huang(2006) 43 developing countries from 
1970 to 1998.
Positive causal effects in both 
directions(between F.D and 
private investment)
What about using a plethora of 
variables. 
FD: Financial Development. OECD: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. M1: Monetary plus demand deposits. M2:M1 
plus savings and time deposits. 
Source(Author’s synthesis) 
The present paper deviates from the literature summarized in Table 1 in the following 
ways.   (1) Contrary to Xu(2000), Landon & Smith(2009) and Misati  & Nyamongo(2010) 
among others; we cut adrift the mainstream use of more or less three variables in finance-
investment  causality  analysis.  (2)  The choice  of  variables  will  be contingent  on  a  robust 
selection criteria, such that selected variables should be representative of a broad database. (3) 
In contrast to the  mainstream approach to model specification(Afangideh, 2010), our choice 
of optimal lags for goodness of fit, will not be  arbitrary but contingent on an information 
criterion  whose lag specification  best  fits  each  country’s  data  structure.  (4)  We focus  on 
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Africa  where  scholarly  research  on  the  finance-investment  nexus  is  scares(Misati  & 
Nyamongo,2010). 
As we have highlighted before, a great chunk of studies in this area are mainly focused 
on high and middle-income countries with little  reference to African economies.  The few 
studies  focusing  on  Africa  do  not  fully  exploit  the  plethora  of  investment  and  financial 
development  indicators  available(Ndikumana,2000;  Misati  & Nyamongo,2010;  Afangideh, 
2010).  It  is  therefore  the  interest  of  this  paper  to  introduce  previously  missing  financial 
development components in the assessment of the investment-finance nexus in a continent 
where scholarly research on the linkage is scares. 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data
We investigate  a  sample  of  16  African  countries.  Owing  to  the  multidimensional 
nature of the work it is very space consuming to engage in the lengthy task of investigating all 
current 54 African countries. Constraints in data availability have also affected the size of the 
sample. While financial indicators are obtained from the Financial Development and Structure 
Database(FDSD), investment flows originate from African Development Indicators(ADI) of 
the World Bank(WB).  At the onset we selected nine financial  development variables and 
fifteen investment flow measures  as summarized in Appendix 1 and Appendix 2 respectively. 
By virtue  of  correlation  analyses,  conceptual  similarities  and usages  in  the  literature,  we 
narrow the variables to four in each conceptual category. Financial variables entail dynamics 
of depth, efficiency, size and activity(hence DESA variables) while investment variables are 
domestic,  foreign,  portfolio  and total  flows(hence DFPT variables).  Time series spans are 
country-specific owing to constraints in data availability. In  a bid for clarity in presentation,  
selected variables are elucidated in two strands.
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3.1.1 Financial intermediary development
Borrowing from recent  African  finance  literature(Asongu,2011abc)  and the  FDSD, 
DESA variables include  the following.  Financial depth measured in terms of broad money 
supply(M2) in ratio of GDP. This measure represents the monetary base plus demand, saving 
and time deposits. M2 has been widely used as a measure of financial depth in the investment-
finance literature(Xu,2000;  Rousseau & Vuthipadadorn,  2005; Misati  & Nyamongo,2010). 
Financial  efficiency in  the  context  of  our  paper  neither  refers  to  a  profitability  oriented 
concept nor to the production efficiency of decision making units in the financial sector(via 
Data Envelopment Analysis:  DEA). What the paper seeks to highlight by  efficiency is the 
ability to banks to fulfill their fundamental role of transforming mobilized deposits into credit 
for economic operators. Assuming economic operators will utilize the credit for investment 
ends, then we should expect a positive causality flowing from financial efficiency to domestic 
investment.  Financial  size in  the  context  of  our  paper  is  according  to  the   FDSD which 
defines it as the ratio ‘deposit bank assets’ to ‘total assets’(deposit banks assets on central 
bank assets plus deposit bank assets). Financial activity  captures the ability  of banks to grant 
credit  to  economic  operators.  The  indicator  is  measured  as  the  ratio  of  private  credit  by 
domestic banks on GDP. Hence from common sense and to some extent economic theory, we 
expect a positive causality flow from financial activity to some investment types(especially 
domestic investment). 
3.1.2 Investment flows
These  flows  include  domestic,  foreign,  portfolio  and  total  investments.  All  the 
measures  are  in  ratios  of  GDP.  Total  investment  is  the  sum  of  domestic  and  foreign 
investments. As earlier highlighted, we initially had to plethora of 15 investment flows which 
have been narrowed down to these four categories(see Appendix 2). 
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3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 General model specification 
Naturally,  when dealing  with a  vector  autoregressive(VAR) process  the lag length 
used is very crucial for the outcome of the analysis. This stems from the fact that increasing 
lags in VAR processes decreases the power of the test. Conversely, if the lag length is too 
small  the remaining serial  correlations in the error terms will bias the test.  In this wise it 
becomes  vital  to  choose  an  optimal  lag  that  fits  the  data  structure  (goodness  of  fit)  and 
specifies  the  model  accurately1.  Hence  lag  selection  in  VAR  models  is  the  information 
criterion,  just as Ordinary Least Squares(OLS) have the coefficient of determination(R²) and 
the Fisher statistics as information criteria. In the optimal lag selection process, we opt for the 
Akaike Information Criterion-AIC(Akaike, 1973). As shown by Liew(2004), while  the AIC 
and Final Prediction Error(FPE) are most accurate in estimating the optimal lag length for 
small  observations(less  than  60),  the  Hannan-Quinn  Criterion(HQC)  is  more  appropriate 
when observations exceed this threshold. Schwarz Information Criterion(SIC) and Bayesian 
Information  Criterion(BIC)  have  a  greater  probability  of  producing  underestimations2.  In 
selecting the optimal lag length for our VAR processes, since observations for all countries 
are less than 60, we shall adopt the AIC3. 
3.2.2 Unit root tests 
Since our data structure is time series oriented, to control for serial correlations we test 
for  stationary  properties  by employing  Phillips  & Perron-PP (1988).  Borrowing from the 
literature(Choi  &  Chung,1995;  Gries  et  al.,2009),  the  PP  test  is  more  appropriate  in  the 
context of low frequency data. Thus this test is relevant given the annual span of the data. 
Bearing in mind, the presence of  unit root (absence of stationarity) is unfavorable to a short  
1 The goodness of fit test is ensured by an optimal lag selection criterion. We shall endeavor to select the 
criterion that best emphasis’ the number of lags which make the model compatible with the data structure. 
2 Overestimations are negligible for all criteria(Liew,2004, p.1). 
3 In our choice of truncated lags we respect the method of  Newey and West (1994) for estimating truncated 
bandwidth  in unit root tests.
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run VAR process(but appealing to long-run analysis: VECM), we shall test for first difference 
stationarity;  I(1), when level  series fails to account for an absence of unit root: I(0). It is 
worthwhile  noting  that,  whereas  the  restricted  version  of  VAR  processes  are  short-run 
estimations and presupposes stationary variables, a precondition for its unrestricted or long 
run equivalent is the presence of unit root (Engle and Granger, 1987). An in-depth coverage of 
the mechanics of unit root tests is not deserving of examination here because of their wide 
understanding and application.  Results of PP test are summarized in Tables 2-3.
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Table 2.   Phillips-Perron unit root test  for investment flows
Countries
Domestic Investment Foreign Investment Portfolio Investment Total Investment
Level 1st Diff. Level 1st Diff. Level 1st Diff. Level 1st Diff.
Z(ti) Z(tit) Z(ti) Z(tit) Z(ti) Z(tit) Z(ti) Z(tit) Z(ti) Z(tit) Z(ti) Z(tit) Z(ti) Z(tit) Z(ti) Z(tit)
Burkina F. -2.31 -2.38 -7.30*** -7.31*** -7.37*** -6.03*** -7.36*** -7.02*** -4.59*** -4.73*** -9.45*** -9.32*** -1.59 -1.04 -6.73*** -7.10***
Cape Verde -1.74 -1.79 -3.93*** -3.93** -0.33 -2.35 -4.49*** -4.72*** -5.29*** -5.57*** -11.5*** -11.1*** -3.25 -3.19 -5.87*** -5.70***
Egypt -2.27 -2.89 -4.78*** -4.85*** -1.81 -1.70 -5.63*** -5.84*** -4.81*** -4.51*** -8.47*** -8.43*** -2.37 -2.61 -5.31*** -5.29***
Ethiopia -2.15 -3.84** -9.25*** -9.03*** -1.89 -3.04 -2.28 -1.21 n.a n.a n.a n.a -2.35 -3.11 -7.24*** -7.35***
Ghana -0.074 -2.26 -7.00*** -7.67*** -2.33 -4.30*** -6.46*** -6.45*** n.a n.a n.a n.a -0.41 -2.42 -6.65*** -6.87***
Guinea B. -1.93 -1.78 -5.57*** -7.52*** 1.60 1.60 -5.34*** -5.22*** -2.66 -2.62 1.60 n.a -2.14 -2.02 -5.93*** -7.00***
Kenya -3.5** -4.1** -10.1*** -9.99*** -4.76*** -4.60*** -8.42*** -8.62*** -3.17** -3.52** -7.06*** -6.97*** -3.4** -4.0** -9.22*** -9.11***
Madagascar 1.73 0.031 -6.72*** -7.19*** -1.66 -3.15* -4.14*** -4.10** n.a n.a n.a n.a 0.50 -0.87 6.76*** -7.10***
Mauritania -3.7** -3.76** -8.83*** -10.6*** -3.01* -4.11** -5.82*** -5.72** -3.04** -2.93 -7.64*** -7.69*** -3.80 -3.79 -6.38*** -6.41***
Morocco -2.10 -2.40 -5.39*** -5.30*** -4.54*** -8.35*** -22.7*** -22.3*** -5.52*** -5.60*** -11.4*** -11.2*** -2.31 -2.80 -7.07*** -6.99***
Mozambique -3.82* -3.86* -7.10*** -6.76*** -2.14 -2.21 -3.90** -3.73* -2.17 -2.24 -3.47** -3.33 -2.62 -2.52 -4.61*** -4.39**
Niger -2.36 -2.34 -5.88*** -5.76*** -3.67*** -3.73** -9.98*** -10.1*** -5.62*** -6.35*** -13.8*** -13.5*** -2.48 -2.94 -7.34*** -7.41***
Sudan -1.88 -2.20 -4.32*** -4.32*** -0.85 -1.99 -4.43*** -3.99** -4.95*** -5.56*** -13.3*** -13.1*** -1.22 -1.62 -7.17*** -7.22***
Togo -2.32 -2.70 -5.46*** -5.36*** -4.94*** -4.77*** -7.99*** -7.74*** -5.98*** -6.03*** -13.1*** -12.9*** -2.14 2.76 -5.96*** -5.95***
Note:   Z(ti) and  Z(tit) depict the PP test statistic with an intercept(constant) and ‘an intercept with a linear trend’ respectively. *,** and *** respectively denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%  
levels. As a decision rule, critical values are taken from MacKinnon (1996). Truncated lag (bandwidth) is with respect to the Newey-West criterion . 
Table 3.   Phillips-Perron unit root test for financial development dynamics 
Countries
Financial  Depth Financial  Efficiency Financial  Size Financial  Activity
Level 1st Diff. Level 1st Diff. Level 1st Diff. Level 1st Diff.
Z(ti) Z(tit) Z(ti) Z(tit) Z(ti) Z(tit) Z(ti) Z(tit) Z(ti) Z(tit) Z(ti) Z(tit) Z(ti) Z(tit) Z(ti) Z(tit)
Burkina F.    -3.71*** -4.77*** -10.1*** -9.81*** -2.040 -4.03** -7.62*** -7.53*** -2.18 -2.49 -6.76*** -6.75*** -1.86 -1.78 -5.06*** -5.03***
Cape Verde -0.48 -2.16 -2.57 -2.48 -1.76 -2.24 -4.48*** -4.38** -1.03 -1.52 -2.71* -2.69 0.05 -2.14 -2.95* -2.87
Egypt -1.87 -1.68 -4.74*** -4.90*** -2.20 -2.28 -4.71*** -4.63*** -1.40 -2.32 -4.57*** -4.53*** -0.86 -1.91 -2.33 -2.23
Ethiopia -1.30 0.041 -4.80*** -5.31*** -1.62 -2.46 -4.71*** -5.11*** -1.22 -1.29 -6.24*** -6.61*** -2.08 -2.11 -3.42** -3.38*
Ghana -0.75 -0.97 -7.01*** -9.33*** -1.50 -2.53 -4.87*** -4.91*** -3.17** -3.76** -13.1*** -19.4*** 0.71 -1.05 -2.91* -4.37***
Guinea B. -1.41 -1.67 -3.07** -3.01 -5.45*** -5.64*** -8.58*** -8.57*** -0.79 1.24 -0.56 -1.14 -1.73 -1.69 -2.04 -1.91
Kenya -5.68*** -4.80*** -9.55*** -10.2*** -3.40** -3.36* -7.26*** -7.18*** -1.67 -1.34 -8.53*** -9.12*** -2.07 -1.07 -5.00*** -5.52***
Madagascar -3.14** -3.08 -6.17*** -6.09*** -1.32 -2.06 -6.95*** -6.89*** -1.30 -0.36 -3.59*** -4.29*** -0.71 -2.20 -4.91*** -4.91***
Mauritania 0.17 -2.33 -4.26*** -4.35* -1.14 -1.4 -4.05*** -4.64*** -0.79 -1.31 -4.07*** -4.34** -0.78 -2.00 -3.81** -3.99**
Morocco 1.53 -0.97 -6.08*** -6.43*** -1.85 -2.12 -5.19*** -5.20*** -0.41 -2.01 -6.57*** -6.55*** 0.22 -1.51 -3.36** -3.49*
Mozambique -0.76 -1.85 -2.71* -3.28 -1.46 -1.79 -1.66 -1.77 -3.05* -1.84 -3.78** -5.45*** -1.78 -2.10 -2.99* -2.84
Niger -1.66 -1.64 -4.32*** -4.27*** -1.81 -2.79 -5.79*** -5.67*** -2.68* -2.73 -7.61*** -7.57*** -1.24 -1.43 -4.20*** -4.16**
Sudan -2.59 -3.17 -6.11*** -6.12*** -1.48 -0.51 -6.86*** -7.44*** -1.19 -0.47 -4.78*** -5.28*** -2.07 -2.97 -6.33*** -6.27***
Togo -1.73 -1.69 -4.19*** -4.13** -2.79* -3.36* -9.26*** -9.11*** -3.62*** -3.45* -6.48*** -6.52*** -2.24 -2.40 -4.73*** -4.75***
Note:   Z(ti) and  Z(tit) depict the PP test statistic with an intercept(constant) and an ‘intercept with a linear trend’ respectively. *,** and *** respectively denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%  
levels. As a decision rule, critical values are taken from MacKinnon (1996). Truncated lag (bandwidth) is with respect to the Newey-West criterion . 
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3.2.3 Cointegration tests
Long-run equilibrium relationships between sequences could be determined by various 
methods.  In  comparison  with  cointegration  tests  proposed  in  earlier  literature  (Engle  & 
Granger, 1987; Stock & Watson,1988) we opt to use Johansen(1995a,1995b) because of its 
wide application and desirable properties(all tested variables are treated as endogenous). This 
method  consists  of  testing  restrictions  imposed  by cointegration  on the unrestricted  VAR 
process in the series.  Between the  two tests  at  our disposal(trace  statistics  and maximum 
Eigen  value),  we  shall  report  only   the  trace  statistics  in  a  bid  to  obtain  more  robust 
results(Cheung  &  Lai,  1993).  Borrowing  from   Ahking(2001),  we  argue  that  when  a 
deterministic  trend4 is  included  in  the  co-integration  model,  results  are  less  favorable. 
However  robust results are obtained with the exclusion of a linear deterministic trend in the 
model.  This  is  logical  in  the  perspective  that,  the  co-integration  model  is  based  on  the 
difference of the series which has been de-trended in the stationary process. Beyond this fact, 
the literature(Johansen,1995b; Hansen & Juselius,1995) cautions on a model that doesn’t have 
a  linear trend. It is argued that the minimum deterministic component in the model could be a 
constant in the co-integrating space to account for differences in measurement units. Logic, 
common sense and to some extent economic theory also help us  understand that, even if we 
hadn’t the intention of including a constant in the co-integration equation, the presence of any 
I(1)  variables  in  the  Vector  Error  Correction  Model(VECM)  require  the  presence  of  an 
intercept in the model. In line with the justification above, our cointegration model will have 
only an intercept in the Cointegration Equation(level) and none in the VAR(first difference) 
equation. Tables 4 and 5 present bivariate VAR statistics of the cointegration test. 
 
4 Consistent with deterministic components in time series but less relevant from a  visual-graphical perspective of 
our dataset.
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Table: 4 Johansen trace statistics for bivariate VAR (Depth, Efficiency and Investment)
Country Variables
 Financial Depth and Investment Flows Financial Efficiency and Investment Flows
AIC
(Max)
Rank
of CE
Trace test [p-value] AIC
(Max)
Rank
of CE
Trace test [p-value]
Burkina  F
(1962-2008)
PF Invt.(P)
Total Invt.(T)
n.a n.a n.a n.a 1(4)
1(4)
 None
 At most 1
None
At most 1
23.240 **
3.6467 
6.9744 
2.4304 
[0.0171]
[0.4789]
[0.8927]
[0.6941]
Cape Verde
(1985-2008)
Domestic 
Invt(D’)
FD Invt.(F)
Total Invt.(T)
1(3)
2(3)
2(3)
 None
 At most 1
 None
 At most 1
 None
 At most 1
12.902 
1.6169 
16.291 
3.3415 
9.5268 
2.3041 
[0.3799]
[0.8427]
[0.1638]
[0.5295]
[0.6896]
[0.7178]
1(3)
1(3)
1(3)
 None
 At most 1
 None
 At most 1
 None
 At most 1
7.0325 
2.7718 
6.3482 
1.4663 
15.188 
3.3304 
[0.8891]
[0.6307]
[0.9268]
[0.8679]
[0.2204]
[0.5314]
Egypt
(1971-2007)
Domestic 
Invt(D’)
FD Invt.(F)
Total Invt.(T)
2(3)
1(3)
2(3)
 None
 At most 1
 None
 At most 1
 None
 At most 1
22.337 **
8.1484 *
15.663 
3.7530 
20.368 **
8.3196 *
[0.0237]
[0.0785]
[0.1944]
[0.4620]
[0.0467]
[0.0727]
2(3)
2(3)
2(3)
 None
 At most 1
  None
 At most 1
 None
 At most 1
16.187 
5.3622 
10.328 
1.5195 
17.104 
6.6440 
[0.1686]
[0.2550]
[0.6138]
[0.8592]
[0.1299]
[0.1510]
Ethiopia
(1977-2008)
Domestic 
Invt(D’)
Total Invt.(T)
1(3)
1(3)
 None
 At most 1
 None
 At most 1
10.875 
1.7176 
12.766 
1.8844 
[0.5616]
[0.8252]
[0.3911]
[0.7954]
1(3)
3(3)
 None
 At most 1
 None
 At most 1
15.383 
1.1713 
18.071 *
1.6861 
[0.2094]
[0.9133]
[0.0974]
[0.8307]
Ghana
(1973-2006)
Domestic 
Invt(D’)
FD Invt.(F)
Total Invt.(T)
4(4)
4(4)
4(4)
 None
 At most 1
 None
 At most 1
 None
At most 1
30.029 ***
6.9706 
20.781 **
5.8330 
30.248 ***
5.2797 
[0.0012]
[0.1314]
[0.0407]
[0.2113]
[0.0011]
[0.2634]
3(4)
1(4)
3(4)
 0 None
 At most 1
 None
 At most 1
 None
 At most 1
10.927 
2.4916 
11.771 
1.5663 
10.485 
2.2191 
[0.5567]
[0.6827]
[0.4780]
[0.8513]
[0.5989]
[0.7337]
Guinea 
Bissau
(1991-2008)
Domestic 
Invt(D’)
PF Invt.(P)
Total Invt.(T)
2(2)
1(2)
2(2)
 None
 At most 1
 None
 At most 1
 None
At most 1
23.745 **
7.4788 
23.439 **
3.3354 
24.964 ***
7.4224 
[0.0142]
[0.1055]
[0.0159]
[0.5305]
[0.0090]
[0.1081]
n.a n.a n.a n.a
Kenya
(1966-2008)
n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
Madagascar
(1965-2008)
Domestic 
Invt(D’)
FD Invt.(F)
Total Invt.(T)
2(4)
1(4)
1(4)
 None
 At most 1
 None
 At most 1
 None
At most 1
19.703 *
5.0404 
10.839 
3.0025 
12.516 
2.5659 
[0.0582]
[0.2890]
[0.5651]
[0.5888]
[0.4122]
[0.6688]
1(4)
2(4)
1(4)
 None
 At most 1
 None
 At most 1
 None
 At most 1
10.478 
4.1580 
21.491 **
1.7340 
10.517 
4.4017 
[0.5995]
[0.4011]
[0.0319]
[0.8223]
[0.5958]
[0.3674]
Mauritania
(1986-2005)
PF Invt.(P)
Total 
Invt.(T)
n.a
1(2)
 n.a
None
At most 1
n.a
15.122 
2.3736 
n.a
[0.2242]
[0.7048]
1(2)
1(2)
 None
 At most 1
 None
At most 1
9.7728 
1.1824 
19.096 *
1.4983 
[0.6666]
[0.9117]
[0.0708]
[0.8627]
Morocco
(1968-2008)
Domestic 
Invt(D’)
 Total Invt.(T)
1(4)
1(4)
 None
At most 1
 None
At most 1
23.096 **
7.4138 
24.379 **
9.1736 **
[0.0180]
[0.1085]
[0.0112]
[0.0493]
1(4)
1(4)
 None
At most 1
None
At most 1
11.204 
1.8853 
11.830 
1.9211 
[0.5306]
[0.7952]
[0.4727]
[0.7887]
Mozambique
(1993-2008)
Domestic 
Invt(D’)
PF Invt.(P)
FD Invt.(F)
Total Invt.(T)
1(2)
2(2)
1(2)
1(2)
 None
 At most 1
 None
 At most 1
 None
At most 1
 None
At most 1
12.050 
0.51599 
12.464 
0.99160 
11.609 
1.3618 
8.9049 
0.62699 
[0.4529]
[0.9840]
[0.4167]
[0.9374]
[0.4929]
[0.8847]
[0.7462]
[0.9757]
2(2)
2(2)
2(2)
2(2)
 None
 At most 1
 None
 At most 1
 None
At most 1 
 None
At most 1 
15.932 
2.2597 
19.061 *
3.0336 
21.844 **
5.9936 
19.406 *
3.0342 
[0.1808]
[0.7261]
[0.0715]
[0.5833]
[0.0282]
[0.1979]
[0.0641]
[0.5832]
Niger
(1969-2008)
Domestic 
Invt(D’)
Total Invt.(T)
4(4)
2(4)
 None
At most 1
 None
At most 1
21.543 **
8.8876 *
10.872 
3.8387 
[0.0313]
[0.0562]
[0.5620]
[0.4486]
4(4)
4(4)
 None
At most 1
 None
At most 1
16.000 
2.0145 
19.869 *
2.6682 
[0.1775]
[0.7716]
[0.0551]
[0.6498]
Sudan
(1973-2008)
Domestic 
Invt(D’)
FD Invt.(F)
Total Invt.(T)
2(3)
1(3)
2(3)
 None
 At most 1
 None
 At most 1
 None
 At most 1
13.071 
1.8401 
11.092 
1.3040 
17.756 
3.5320 
[0.3662]
[0.8034]
[0.5411]
[0.8936]
[0.1072]
[0.4976]
3(3)
1(3)
3(3)
 None
 At most 1
 None
 At most 1
 None
At most 1
16.901 
2.6972 
10.265 
4.0591 
21.307 **
3.9695 
[0.1378]
[0.6445]
[0.6199]
[0.4155]
[0.0340]
[0.4287]
Togo
(1971-2008)
Domestic 
Invt(D’)
Total Invt.(T)
2(3)
2(3)
None
At most 1
 None
At most 1
14.740 
2.1659 
16.341 
2.5050 
[0.2471]
[0.7436]
[0.1615]
[0.6802]
2(3)
2(3)
None
At most 1
 None
At most 1
14.740 
2.1659 
16.341 
2.5050 
[0.2471]
[0.7436]
[0.1615]
[0.6802]
Note that ‘n.a’ denotes the invalidity of the test because level series of variable is not stationary at least at 1% or 5% significance level for  
both ‘intercept’ and ‘intercept and trend’ categories. (***),(**) and (*) respectively depict; a very strong hypothesis against H0(P<0.01),  
moderate evidence against H0(0.01<=P<0.05), and suggestive evidence against H0(0.05<=P<0.1); on the number of co-integrating  equations 
(CE). The test was conducted with the assumption of a restricted constant in the CE and no trend in both the CE and VAR equation. Optimal 
lags are based on AIC, and their maximum (Max) lag lengths vary from 2 to 4 depending on the number of observations in each country. 
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Table: 5    Johansen trace statistics for bivariate VAR( Size, Activity and Investment) 
Country Variables
 Financial Size and Investment Flows Financial Activity and Investment Flows
AIC
(Max)
Rank
of CE
Trace test [p-value] AIC
(Max)
Rank
of CE
Trace test [p-value]
Burkina  F
(1962-2008)
PF Invt.(P)
Total Invt.(T)
1(4)
1(4)
 None
At most 1
 None
At most 1
23.081 **
3.9389 
11.942 
5.0382 
[0.0181]
[0.4333]
[0.4626]
[0.2893]
1(4)
1(4)
 None
At most 1
None
At most 1
21.835 **
3.3353 
10.778 
3.5055 
[0.0283]
[0.5305]
[0.5709]
[0.5019]
Cape Verde
(1985-2008)
Domestic 
Invt(D’)
FD Invt.(F)
Total Invt.(T)
1(3)
1(3)
1(3)
 None
At most 1
 None
At most 1
 None
At most 1
13.983 
1.6205 
11.258 
3.2759 
19.962 *
6.2205 
[0.2974]
[0.8421]
[0.5255]
[0.5407]
[0.0534]
[0.1802]
1(3)
1(3)
1(3)
 None
At most 1
 None
At most 1
None
At most 1
20.322 **
2.5892 
19.280 *
5.2718 
28.568 ***
10.100 **
[0.0474]
[0.6645]
[0.0667]
[0.2642]
[0.0022]
[0.0320]
Egypt
(1971-2007)
Domestic 
Invt(D’)
FD Invt.(F)
Total Invt.(T)
2(3)
1(3)
2(3)
 None
At most 1
 None
At most 1
 None
At most 1
21.491 **
2.4418 
4.8068 
1.1531 
19.262 *
2.8016 
[0.0319]
[0.6920]
[0.9795]
[0.9158]
[0.0671]
[0.6253]
2 (3)
2 (3)
2 (3)
 None
At most 1
 None
At most 1
None
At most 1
18.349 *
1.9776 
9.2289 
3.0038 
16.362 
2.3558 
[0.0894]
[0.7784]
[0.7171]
[0.5886]
[0.1606]
[0.7081]
Ethiopia
(1977-2008)
Domestic 
Invt(D’)
Total Invt.(T)
1(3)
1(3)
 None
At most 1
 None
At most 1
10.593 
2.5524 
11.415 
3.4942 
[0.5885]
[0.6714]
[0.5108]
[0.5038]
2(3)
2(3)
 None
At most 1
None
At most 1
11.886 
2.0806 
17.224 
5.2234 
[0.4676]
[0.7594]
[0.1255]
[0.2693]
Ghana
(1973-2006)
Domestic 
Invt(D’)
FD Invt.(F)
Total Invt.(T)
n.a n.a n.a 2(4)
2(4)
2(4)
 None
At most 1
 None
At most 1
None
At most 1
12.369 
1.5632 
12.616 
1.4987 
12.372 
1.6025 
[0.4248]
[0.8518]
[0.4037]
[0.8626]
[0.4246]
[0.8451]
Guinea Bissau
(1991-2008)
Domestic 
Invt(D’)
Total Invt.(T)
2(2)
2(2)
 None
At most 1
 None
At most 1
18.307 *
2.9274 
17.761 
2.8087 
[0.0906]
[0.6023]
[0.1070]
[0.6240]
2(2)
2(2)
None
At most 1 
None
At most 1
33.080 ***
4.6258 
12.372 
1.6025 
[0.0003]
[0.3382]
[0.4246]
[0.8451]
Kenya
(1966-2008)
n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
Madagascar
(1965-2008)
Domestic 
Invt(D’)
FD Invt.(F)
Total Invt.(T)
2(4)
4(4)
2(4)
None
At most 1
 None
At most 1
 None
At most 1
11.014 
4.3463 
25.098 ***
1.8128 
9.5760 
4.0192 
[0.5485]
[0.3749]
[0.0086]
[0.8083]
[0.6850]
[0.4213]
1(4)
2(4)
1(4)
 None
At most 1
 None
At most 1
None
At most 1
11.996 
4.8792 
26.032 ***
1.3246 
12.145 
4.0661 
[0.4577]
[0.3074]
[0.0060]
[0.8905]
[0.4444]
[0.4144]
Mauritania
(1986-2005)
PF Invt.(P)
Total Invt.(T)
2(2)
2(2)
 None
At most 1
 None
At most 1
14.410 
4.5701 
29.950 ***
5.5865 
[0.2683]
[0.3453]
[0.0012]
[0.2333]
1(2)
1(2)
 None
At most 1
None
At most 1
9.6807 
1.2374 
14,402 
1.0961 
[0.6752]
[0.9037]
[0.2687]
[0.9237]
Morocco
(1968-2008)
Domestic 
Invt(D’)
Total Invt.(T)
1(4)
1(4)
 None
At most 1 
 None
At most 1
10.005 
1.2305 
11.245 
1.5441 
[0.6446]
[0.9047]
[0.5267]
[0.8550]
2(4)
2(4)
 None
At most 1
None
At most 1
10.699 
1.9632 
10.950 
2.2633 
[0.5784]
[0.7811]
[0.5546]
[0.7254]
Mozambique
(1993-2008)
Domestic 
Invt(D’)
PF Invt.(P)
FD Invt.(F)
Total Invt.(T)
1(2)
1(2)
1(2)
1(2)
 None
At most 1
 None
At most 1
None
At most 1
 None
At most 1
20.353 **
8.8217 *
13.696 
4.1090 
19.159 *
8.8499 *
16.387 
7.5190 
[0.0469]
[0.0579]
[0.3181]
[0.4082]
[0.0694]
[0.0572]
[0.1594]
[0.1036]
2(2)
1(2)
2(2)
2(2)
 None
At most 1
 None
At most 1
None
At most 1 
 None
At most 1
28.980 ***
12.926 ***
10.189 
3.6165 
20.437 **
8.3149 *
27.411 ***
10.056 **
[0.0018]
[0.0082]
[0.6271]
[0.4838]
[0.0456]
[0.0728]
[0.0035]
[0.0327]
Niger
(1969-2008)
Domestic 
Invt(D’)
Total Invt.(T)
1(4)
1(4)
None
At most 1
 None
At most 1
13.393 
5.7803 
14.417 
6.4982 
[0.3409]
[0.2158]
[0.2678]
[0.1605]
1(4)
1(4)
 None
At most 1
None
At most 1
18.376 *
2.6679 
12.860 
1.1849 
[0.0887]
[0.6499]
[0.3833]
[0.9113]
Sudan
(1973-2008)
Domestic 
Invt(D’)
FD Invt.(F)
Total Invt.(T)
3(3)
1(3)
3(3)
 None
At most 1
 None
At most 1
None
At most 1
10.323 
1.9588 
14.472 
2.7099 
12.212 
3.4099 
[0.6144]
[0.7819]
[0.2642]
[0.6421]
[0.4386]
[0.5179]
2(3)
1(3)
2(3)
 None
At most 1
 None
At most 1
None
At most 1
11.178 
2.7544 
8.0691 
1.7042 
11.345 
2.2773 
[0.5330]
[0.6339]
[0.8162]
[0.8276]
[0.5173]
[0.7228]
Togo
(1971-2008)
Domestic 
Invt(D’)
Total Invt.(T)
3(3)
1(3)
 None
At most 1
 None
At most 1
85.011 ***
5.0657 
17.802 
5.1612 
[0.0000]
[0.2862]
[0.1057]
[0.2759]
1(3)
1(3)
None
At most 1 
 None
At most 1
13.310 
4.0219 
11.287 
3.5350 
[0.3474]
[0.4209]
[0.5228]
[0.4971]
Note that ‘n.a’ denotes the invalidity of the test because level series of variable is not stationary at least, at 1% or 5% significance level for  
both ‘intercept’ and ‘intercept and trend’ categories. (***),(**) and (*) respectively depict; a very strong hypothesis against H0(P<0.01),  
moderate evidence against H0(0.01<=P<0.05), and suggestive evidence against H0(0.05<=P<0.1); on the number of co-integrating  equations 
(CE). The test was conducted with the assumption of a restricted constant in the CE and no trend in both the CE and VAR equation. Optimal 
lags are based on AIC, and their maximum (Max) lag lengths vary from 2 to 4 depending on the number of observations in each country. 
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As Tables 4 and 5 illustrate, majority of paired variables exhibiting unit root fail to 
demonstrate a long-run equilibrium. In some cases, where the cointegration rank(r) is equal to 
the number endogenous variables, the cointegration vector is invertible and the processes are 
all stationary at level; I(0).  Where the r =0, the processes are all I(1) and not cointegrated.  
However,  cointegration  occurs  when “r”  is  between  zero  and the  number  of  endogenous 
variables(0<r<n). Given the results, we proceed to estimate short-term dynamics(adjustments) 
for each cointegrated pair. This is the unrestricted version of causality analysis. 
4 Causality analysis 
As we must have earlier outlined. Our empirical road-map will consist primarily of 
testing for long-run causality with a VECM. When the likelihood of this test is not feasible 
owing to cointegration constraints, we test for simple Granger causality with restricted VAR 
processes.  
4.1 Long run estimations
For long-run causality,  let’s  consider foreign direct  investment  (FDI) and financial 
efficiency(FE) with no lagged difference, such that:
tt FEFDI β=                                                                                                              (1)
tt FDIFE β=                                                                                                                (2)
Resulting VECMs are the following
tttt FEFDIFDI ,111 )( εβα +−=∆ −−                                                                     (3)
tttit FDIFEFE ,211 )(' εβα +−=∆ −−                                                         (4)
 
From above models,  the  only right hand term is the error correction term. This term is 
zero in the long-run equilibrium. It is non zero when  FDI and FE deviate from this long-run 
equilibrium. It helps each variable to adjust and partially restore the equilibrium relation after 
a shock.  The speed of adjustment in event of disequilibrium is measured by α  and α’ for 
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corrections of FDI and FE respectively. Therefore, following the example above we intend to 
replicate  the  models  for  each  combination  of  DESA   and   DFPT  variables  that  are 
cointegrated. In so doing, we maintain the same deterministic trend assumptions applied in the 
cointegration tests.  These  short-run adjustments are in line with the long-run equilibrium and 
vary when actual equilibriums in the pairs are not in tune with their  cointegrated relation. To 
get this done, we specify our model with the AIC and respect the same number of maximum 
lags as in the Johansen test. Deterministic trend components are compatible with those from 
resulting  VAR process  that  defined the  long-run equilibrium(cointegration)  test5.   Results 
presented in Tables 6 and 7  are combined with those from restricted VAR processes(short run 
causality).
4.2 Short run estimations 
       Considering a basic bivariate finite–order vector autoregressive (VAR) model,  the 
wisdom of   Granger causality as reflected by equations (5) and (6) below, is grounded on 
evaluating  how past  values  of  FDI  could  help  past  values  of  financial  efficiency(FE)  in 
explaining the present value of FDI(Eq.5). Since this test preconditions the absence of unit 
root  for  each  pair  under  consideration  we shall   work  with  first  differenced  series6.  The 
resulting restricted VAR models are as follows:
tjt
p
j
q
j
jjtjt FEFDIFDI εδλ +∆+∆=∆ −
= =
−∑ ∑
1 0
'                                             (5)
tjt
p
j
q
j
jjtjt FDIFEFE εδλ +∆+∆=∆ −
= =
−∑ ∑
1 0
'                                                 (6)
It is important to note that the statement FDI  granger causes  FE does not imply that  
FE  is the effect or the result of FDI. Granger causality measures precedence and information 
content, but does not by itself indicate causality in the more common use of the term.  The test 
5 Model will be based on a restricted constant; allowing for just a constant in the CE(Cointegration Equation) and 
none in the unrestricted VAR equation(VECM).
6 The choice of first differenced series is also for comparative motives. As observed in Tables 2-3, absence of 
unit root is more  in first differenced than level data.
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for zero restrictions on the VAR model is captured by the F-statistics,  which is the Wald 
statistics  for  the  joint  hypothesis  that  parameters  for  lagged  values  of  FDI  equal  zero. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis is the position that FDI doesn’t granger cause FE(Eq.6). 
Hence, we shall apply (where circumstances are favorable)7, the two sets of equations 
for every pair of variables in each country.  
Table:6 Causality analysis for  Investment led Finance
Country
Model 
Specifications
Domestic 
Investment
Foreign 
Investment
Portfolio 
Investment
Total Investment
Long T Short T Long T. Short T Long T. Short T Long T. Short T
AIC(Lags) ECT/t-
stats
F-Stats ECT/t-
stats
F-Stats ECT/t-
stats
F-Stats ECT/t-
stats
F-Stats
Max/Optimal Level 1st Diff. Level 1st Diff. Level 1st Diff. Level 1st Diff.
Panel A:    Impact on Financial  Depth
Burkina F (4)/-,4,-,-,-,1,-,4. s.l 1.675 s.l n.s.a s.l 0.803 n.s.a 1.366
Cape Verde (3)/1,-,2,-,-,-,2,-. --- n.s.d --- n.s.d s.l n.s.d --- n.s.d
Egypt (3)/3,1,3,1,-,3,1,2 --- 1.756 --- 0.981 s.l 0.083 --- 2.204
Ethiopia (4)/2,3,-,-,-,-,1,1 --- 0.089 n.s.a n.s.a n.s.a n.s.a --- 0.001
Ghana (4)/4,4,4,4,-,-,4,1 -0.164 1.440 -0.877** 4.541** n.s.a n.s.a 0.056 0.081
(-0.985) (-2.680) (0.376)
Guinea B (2)/2,2,-,-,1,2,2,- -0.59*** 1.993 n.s.a n.s.a -0.93*** 5.383** 0.003*** n.s.d
(-4.457) (-3.746) (4.681)
Kenya (4)/-,1,-,2,-,2,-,1 s.l 1.707 s.l 2.460 s.l 0.934 s.l 1.743
Madagascar (4)/2,2,1,3,-,-,1,2 0.011 0.830 --- 0.893 n.s.a n.s.a --- 0.763
(0.759)
Mauritania (2)/-,2,-,-,-,-,1,2 s.l 0.022 n.s.a n.s.a n.s.a n.s.a --- 0.021
Morocco (4)/1,2,-,3,-,2,1,1 0.004 3.057* s.l 0.105 s.l 1.623 --- 0.018
(0.798)
Moz’bique (2)/2,1,1,2,2,1,1,- --- 0.435 --- 3.038 --- 0.396 --- n.s.d
Niger (4)/4,1,-,1,-,4,2,1 --- 0.046 s.l 1.926 s.l 0.092 --- 0.558
Sudan (3)/2,1,1,1,-,1,2,1 --- 8.591*** --- 0.085 s.l 2.738 --- 7.816***
Togo (3)/1,1,-,1,-,2,1,1 --- 0.371 s.l 0.2378 s.l 0.070 --- 0.971
Panel B: Impact on Financial Efficiency
Burkina F (4)/-,3,-,-,1,1,1,3 s.l 1.553 s.l n.s.a -0.00*** 1.154 --- 1.684
(-4.791)
Cape Verde (3)/1,1,1,2,-,1,1,1 --- 2.387 --- 0.006 s.l 0.015 --- 0.209
Egypt (3)/2,1,2,1,-,3,2,1 --- 0.001 --- 11.18*** s.l 0.036 --- 1.104
Ethiopia (3)/1,1,-,-,-,-,3,2 --- 0.445 n.s.a n.s.d s.l n.s.a -0.461*** 0.113
(-4.163)
Ghana (4)/3,2,1,1,-,-,3,2 --- 0.252 --- 0.040 s.l n.s.a --- 0.234
Guinea B (2)/-,2,-,-,-,1,-,2 s.l 3.753* s.l n.s.d s.l 0.021 n.s.d 3.255*
Kenya (4)/-,1,-,2,-,2,-,1 s.l 0.106 s.l 0.704 s.l 1.755 s.l 0.012
Madagascar (4)/1,1,1,1,-,-,1,1 --- 0.029 -0.006*** 0.293 s.l n.s.a --- 0.076
(-4.272)
Mauritania (2)/-,2,-,2,1,1,1,2 s.l 0.188 s.l 3.278 --- 0.000 -0.100*** 0.182
(-3.737)
Morocco (4)/1,1,-,2,-,4,1,1 --- 0.058 s.l 0.066 s.l 0.460 --- 0.135
Moz’bique (2)/2,-,2,-,2,-,2,- --- n.s.d 0.074*** n.s.d -0.638** n.s.d -1.421*** n.s.d
(4.344) (-2.647) (-4.338)
Niger (4)/4,4,-,2,-,4,4,2 --- 2.257 s.l 0.045 s.l 0.376 -0.644*** 1.144
(-2.727)
Sudan (3)/1,3,1,1,-,4,3,2 --- 2.012 --- 0.967 s.l 0.241 -0.019 1.874
(-0.185)
Togo (3)/1,3,-,3,-,2,2,1 --- 2.231 s.l 3.081** s.l 0.401 --- 0.002
7 A favorable circumstance for instance is absence of unit root in the first difference of the two series concerned. 
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Panel C: Impact on Financial Size
Burkina F (4)/-,1,-,-,1,1,1,1 s.l 0.004 s.l n.s.a -0.664*** 0.376 --- 0.002
(-4.764)
Cape Verde (3)/3,3,1,2,-,1,1,- --- 1.285 --- 0.020 s.l 0.106 -0.461** n.s.d
(-2.676)
Egypt (3)/2,1,1,2,-,3,2,1 -0.19*** 0.267 --- 1.110 s.l 0.468 -0.412*** 0.014
(-2.963) (-2.928)
Ethiopia (3)/1,1,-,-,-,-,1,1 --- 0.046 s.l n.s.d s.l n.s.a --- 0.001
Ghana (4)/-,1,-,4,-,-,-,1 s.l 0.096 s.l 0.082 s.l n.s.a s.l 0.066
Guinea B (2)/2,-,-,-,2,-,2,- -0.011*** n.s.d s.l n.s.d --- n.s.d --- n.s.d
(-4.156)
Kenya (4)/-,1,-,2,-2,-,1 s.l 0.351 s.l 1.722 s.l 1.192 s.l 0.091
Madagascar (4)/2,1,4,4,-,-,2,1 --- 0.000 -0.004 3.875** s.l n.s.a --- 0.002
(-0.334)
Mauritania (2)/-,2,-,2,2,1,2,2 s.l 0.119 n.s.a 0.723 --- 0.001 -2.368*** 0.117
(-6.304)
Morocco (4)/1,1,-,1,-,2,1,1 --- 0.202 s.l 0.000 s.l 0.309 --- 0.129
Moz’bique (2)/1,1,2,1,1,2,2,- --- 0.401 --- 0.226 --- 1.433 --- 0.432
Niger (4)/4,1,-,1,-,4,1,1 --- 0.146 s.l 0.143 s.l 0.161 --- 0.068
Sudan (3)/1,2,1,1,-,1,3,2 --- 0.753 --- 5.525** s.l 0.055 --- 0.988
Togo (3)/3,1,-,3,-,2,1,1 -0.082* 0.214 s.l 6.228*** s.l 0.007 --- 0.082
(-1.771)
Panel D: Impact on Financial Activity
Burkina F. (4)/-,1,-,-,1,1,1,1 s.l 4.562 s.l n.s.a -0.66*** 0.748 --- 2.944*
(-4.654)
Cape Verde (3)/1,3,1,1,-,1,1,- -0.009 0.419 0.016 0.726 s.l 4.285* --- n.s.d
(-0.168) (0.904)
Egypt (4)/2,-,2,-,-,-,2,- -0.36*** n.s.d --- n.s.d s.l n.s.d --- n.s.d
(-3.795)
Ethiopia (3)/2,1,-,-,-,-,2,1 --- 1.623 n.s.a n.s.d s.l n.s.a --- 1.333
Ghana (4)/2,2,2,2,-,-,2,2 --- 0.982 --- 0.206 s.l n.s.a --- 0.608
Guinea B (2)/2,-,-,-,-,-,2,- -0.82*** n.s.d n.s.a n.s.d s.l n.s.a --- n.s.d
(-5.833)
Kenya (4)/-,2,-,2,-,2,-,2 s.l 1.393 -0.088** 3.558** s.l 3.0605* s.l 2.319
(-2.487)
Madagascar (4)/1,1,2,2,-,-,1,1 --- 6.501** -0.879*** 0.879 s.l n.s.a --- 7.104**
(-5.446)
Mauritania (2)/-,2,-,-,1,1,1,2 s.l 0.075 n.s.a n.s.a --- 0.225 --- 0.072
Morocco (4)/2,1,-,1,-,2,2,1 --- 1.694 s.l 0.006 s.l 3.111* --- 1.255
Moz’bique (2)/2,2,2,2,1,1,1,- --- 4.482** --- 2.201 --- 0.003 --- n.s.d
Niger (4)/1,1,-,2,-,4,1,1 0.064* 1.941 s.l 3.136* s.l 0.229 --- 0.296
(1.999)
Sudan (3)/2,1,2,1,-,1,2,1 --- 4.634** --- 0.047 s.l 7.089** --- 4.115*
Togo (3)/1,1,-,1,-,2,1,2 --- 0.395 s.l 1.460 s.l 0.288 --- 0.092
(F-Stats) F-statistics (Wald statistics)  test the significance of lagged values of the independent variable. (ECT/t-stats) Error Correction term 
and t-ratios. Asterisks indicate the following levels of significance: ***, 1%;**; 5% and *; 10%. “n.a”, means at least one of the variables  
was stationary at level (s.l) series or non stationary at the first difference (n.s.d).  (---), depicts the absence of CEs. VEC analysis is performed  
on the basis of a restricted constant; same deterministic assumptions as in Johansen co-integration test (‘constant only in CE and no trend in 
both CE and VAR). “n.s.a”: not specifically applicable because matrix is not positive definite due to issues with degrees of freedom.
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Table 7 Causality analysis for Finance  led Investment
Country
Model 
Specifications
Financial  Depth Financial Efficiency Financial Size Financial Activity
Long T Short T Long T. Short T Long T Short T Long T. Short T
AIC(Lags) ECT/t-
stats
F-Stats ECT/t-stats F-Stats ECT/t-
stats
F-Stats ECT/t-
stats
F-Stats
Max/Optimal l Level 1st Diff. Level 1st Diff. Level 1st Diff. Level 1st Diff.
Panel A:    Impact on Domestic Investment
Burkina F (4)/-,4,-,3,-,1,-,1 s.l 1.818 s.l 4.079** s.l 0.523 s.l 1.255
Cape Verde (3)/1,-,1,1,3,3,1,3 --- n.s.d --- 0.454 --- 4.183** 0.084*** 5.873**
(4.854)
Egypt (3)/3,1,2,1,2,1,2,- --- 1.995 --- 3.802* -0.158* 1.064 -0.113** n.s.d
(-1.885) (-2.183)
Ethiopia (3)/2,1,1,1,1,1,2,1 --- 0.473 --- 1.017 --- 3.855* --- 0.321
Ghana (4)/4,4,3,2,-,1,2,2 -0.34*** 1.104 --- 6.433*** s.l 0.141 --- 2.892*
(-5.015)
Guinea B (2)/2,1,-,2,2,-,2,- 0.171 2.858 s.l 1.061 0.005 n.s.d -0.025 n.s.d
(0.585) (1.185) (-0.4838)
Kenya (4)/-,1,-,1,-,1,-,2 s.l 0.001 s.l 9.753*** s.l 1.459 s.l 2.570*
Madagascar (4)/2,2,1,1,2,1,1,1 0.026*** 0.411 --- 1.477 --- 0.164 --- 0.714
(3.765)
Mauritania (2)/-,2,-,2,-,2,-,2 s.l 1.808 s.l 0.029 s.l 0.935 s.l 0.784
Morocco (4)/1,2,1,1,1,1,2,1 0.032*** 0.764 --- 0.027 --- 0.002 --- 0.244
(4.043)
Moz’bique (2)/2,1,2,-,1,1,2,2 --- 0.011 --- n.s.d --- 0.052 --- 3.046
Niger (4)/4,1,4,4,4,1,1,1 --- 1.766 --- 1.638 --- 0.004 -0.035*** 0.091
(-3.517)
Sudan (3)/2,1,1,2,1,2,2,1 --- 15.188*** --- 0.010 --- 0.591 --- 7.740***
Togo (3)/1,1,1,2,3,1,1,1 --- 0.052 --- 1.638 0.678*** 3.056* --- 0.013
(14.99)
Panel B: Impact on Foreign Investment
Burkina F (4)/-,-,-,-,-,-,-,-,-- s.l n.s.a s.l n.s.a s.l n.s.a s.l n.s.a
Cape Verde (3)/2,-,1,2,1,2,1,1 --- n.s.d --- 2.518 --- 1.093 0.061*** 0.521
(4.245)
Egypt (3)/3,1,2,1,1,2,2,- --- 0.618 --- 1.898 --- 1.032 --- n.s.d
Ethiopia (3)/-,-,-,-,-,-,-,- n.s.a n.s.a n.s.a n.s.d s.l n.s.d n.s.a n.s.d
Ghana (4)/4,4,1,1,-,1,2,2 0.889** 0.284 --- 2.662 s.l 1.139 --- 2.834*
(2.460)
Guinea B (2)/-,-,-,-,-,-,-,- n.s.a n.s.a s.l n.s.d s.l n.s.d n.s.a n.s.d
Kenya (4)/-,2,-,2,-,2,2,2 s.l 0.199 s.l 0.087 s.l 1.997 -0.114 0.072
(-1.143)
Madagascar (4)/1,3,1,1,4,4,2,2 --- 0.498 -0.113 0.0103 -0.354 1.931 -0.256 0.207
(-1.596) (-4.815) (-0.421)
Mauritania (2)/-,-,-,2,-,2,-,- n.s.a n.s.a s.l 0.319 n.s.a 1.364 n.s.a n.s.a
Morocco (4)/-,3,-,1,-,1,-,1 s.l 32.632*** s.l 0.000 s.l 0.003 s.l 0.955
Moz’bique (2)/1,2,2,-,2,1,2,2 --- 1.536 -0.008 n.s.d --- 1.652 --- 1.865
(-0.144)
Niger (4)/-,1,-,2,-1,-,2 s.l 0.502 s.l 1.554 s.l 3.078* s.l 1.425
Sudan (3)/1,1,1,1,1,1,2,1 --- 0.001 --- 0.049 --- 0.458 --- 0.008
Togo (3)/-,1,-,3,-,3,-,1 s.l 0.902 s.l 5.506*** s.l 0.823 s.l 1.677
Panel C: Impact on Portfolio Investment
Burkina F (4)/-,1,1,1,1,1,1,1 s.l 0.277 0.001
(0.059)
0.008 31,7(0,8) 1.097 0.87
(0.214)
0.207
Cape Verde (3)/-,-,-,1,-,1,-,1 s.l n.s.d s.l 0.010 s.l 0.035 s.l 0.320
Egypt (3)/-,3,-,3,-,3,-,- s.l 0.053 s.l 0.215 s.l 0.242 s.l n.s.d
Ethiopia (3)/-,-,-,-,-,-,-- n.s.a n.s.a s.l n.s.a s.l n.s.a s.l n.s.a
Ghana (4)/-,-,-,-,-,-,-,- n.s.a n.s.a s.l n.s.a s.l n.s.a s.l n.s.a
Guinea B (2)/1,2,-,1,2,-,-,- -34.5*** 4.560** s.l 0.766 --- n.s.d s.l n.s.a
(-4.304)
Kenya (4)/-,2,-,2,-,2,-,2 s.l 0.682 s.l 0.008 s.l 5.649 s.l 0.182
Madagascar (4)/-,-,-,-,-,-,-,- n.s.a n.s.a s.l n.s.a s.l n.s.a s.l n.s.a
Mauritania (2)/-,-,1,1,2,1,1,1 n.s.a n.s.a --- 0.077 --- 0.035 --- 0.002
Morocco (4)/-,2,-,4,-,2,-,2 s.l 0.653 s.l 0.385 s.l 0.567 s.l 0.057
Moz’bique (2)/2,1,2,-,1,2,1,1 --- 0.026 6.430*** n.s.d --- 2.253 --- 1.031
(3.675)
Niger (4)/-,4,-,4,-,4,-,4 s.l 0.605 s.l 0.816 s.l 0.500 s.l 0.299
Sudan (3)/-,1,-,1,-,1,-,1 s.l 0.178 s.l 0.073 s.l 0.061 s.l 0.586
Togo (3)/-,2,-,2,-,2,-,2 s.l 0.995 s.l 8.276*** s.l 14.01*** s.l 1.878
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Panel D: Impact on Total Investment
Burkina F (4)/-,4,1,3,1,1,1,1 n.s.a 2.340* --- 2,954** --- 0,678 --- 1,112
Cape Verde (3)/2,-,1,1,1,-,1,- --- n.s.d --- 0.359 0.309* n.s.d --- n.s.d
(1.828)
Egypt (3)/1,2,2,1,2,1,2,- --- 2.387 --- 4.177** -0.226 0.450 --- n.s.d
(-1.514)
Ethiopia (3)/1,1,3,2,1,1,2,1 --- 1.438 -0.000 3.785** --- 3.866* --- 0.214
(-0.002)
Ghana (4)/4,1,3,2,-,1,2,2 0.270*** 4.317** --- 10.11*** s.l 0.397 --- 5.392**
(5.140)
Guinea B (2)/2,-,-,2,2,-,2,- -0.000 n.s.d s.l 0.931 --- n.s.d --- n.s.d
(-0.642)
Kenya (4)/-,1,-,1,-,1,-,2 s.l 0.030 s.l 8.197*** s.l 2.649 s.l 1.907
Madagascar (4)/1,2,1,1,2,1,1 --- 0.561 1.501 --- 0.153 --- 0.981
Mauritania (2)/1,2,1,2,,2,2,1,2 --- 1.735 -0.092 0.025 0.362 0.918 --- 0.758
(-1.102) (0.554)
Morocco (4)/1,1,1,1,1,1,2,1 --- 0.174 --- 0.133 --- 0.051 --- 0.305
Moz’bique (2)/1,-,2,-,1,-,2,- --- n.s.d 0.887*** n.s.d --- 0.362 --- n.s.d
(2.248)
Niger (4)/2,1,4,2,1,1,1,1 --- 0.338 2.399*** 2.977* --- 0.013 --- 0.334
(2.342)
Sudan (3)/2,1,3,2,3,2,2,1 --- 16.280*** 1.054*** 0.002 --- 0.002 --- 10.20***
(4.314)
Togo (3)/1,1,2,1,1,1,1,1 --- 0.028 --- 3.052* --- 4.943** --- 0.006
(F-Stats) F-statistics (Wald statistics)  test the significance of lagged values of the independent variable. (ECT/t-stats) Error Correction term 
and t-ratios. Asterisks indicate the following levels of significance: ***, 1%;**; 5% and *; 10%. “n.a”, means at least one of the variables  
was stationary at level (s.l) series or non stationary at the first difference (n.s.d).  (---), depicts the absence of CEs. VEC analysis is performed  
on the basis of a restricted constant; same deterministic assumptions as in Johansen co-integration test (‘constant only in CE and no trend in 
both CE and VAR).  “n.s.a”: not specifically applicable because matrix is not positive definite due to issues with degrees of freedom.
 
5 Discussion of results and policy implications 
Based on the findings the following could be established. (1) Granger causality within 
the simple  VAR and VECM frameworks is  bidirectional  for the most  part.  (2) There are 
appealing trends in short-run dynamics: while finance led investment elasticities are positive, 
investment elasticities of finance are negative for the most part8. This confirms conventional 
wisdom  that  financial  development  improves  investment  allocation.  (3)  But  for  Guinea 
Bissau, Mozambique and Togo, finance does not seem to engender portfolio investment. (4) 
Contrary to  mainstream literature,  financial  efficiency appears to  impact  investment  flows 
more than financial depth. 
Bidirectional  short-run  causality  from  investment  flows  to  financial  development 
dynamics  and  vice-versa  point  to  the  complementary  character  of  the  two  phenomena. 
Investment flows are crucial in stimulating economic growth, however the degree to which 
investment contributes to growth and poverty alleviation depends on the ability to gain access 
to financial services. Also, an increase in investment flows may  engender standardization and 
8 With the exception of Guinea Bissau, Mozambique for investment adjustments ;   Egypt, Ghana, Guinea Bissau 
and Niger for finance adjustments.  
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improvement  in  financial  services,  whether  by  the  dynamism  of  the  ICT  sector  or 
multiplication  of  financial  institutions.  The  bidirectional  causality  which  is  in  line  with 
Ang(2009)  also  confirms  a  longstanding  issue  of  endogeneity  in  the  investment-finance 
nexus.
We have also observed form short-term adjustments to the long-run equilibrium that 
while  finance  elasticities  of  investment  flows  are  positive  for  the  most  part,  investment 
elasticities  of  finance  are  negative.  This  implies  that  in  the  aftermath  of  a 
shock(disequilibrium)  financial  development  positively  impacts  investment  flows  while 
investment flows negatively affect financial development. In plainer terms, any disequilibrium 
from the long-run relation between finance and investment will result in the following. (1) 
Higher financial development which will increase investment flows. This finding is broadly in 
line with Ndikumana(2000)  who has  shown that  financial  development  generally  exerts  a 
positive  incidence  on  domestic  investment  in  sub-Saharan  African  countries.  (2)  Lower 
investment  flows which will  mitigate  financial  development.  This interpretation should be 
treated with caution because a few countries are exceptions to the generalization. 
We have also observed from the results that  but  for Guinea Bissau, Mozambique and 
Togo, finance does not seem to engender portfolio investment. The thin incidence of financial 
development  on portfolio  investment could be explained on two counts.  Firstly,  portfolio 
investment is an investment category that is more relevant in financial markets(direct finance) 
than in the banking sector. Secondly, the relative undeveloped nature of the banking sector in 
African countries and immediate need of borrowed funds make it less evident for credit to be 
invested in portfolios instead of real activities by economic agents. 
From the results, we have also been able to establish that financial efficiency impacts  
investment more than does financial depth. Growth in the later denotes an extensive use of 
currency  which  might  not  necessarily  be  investment-oriented.  The  former  by  definition 
accounts  for  the  ability  of  banks  to  transform  mobilized  funds(deposits)  into  credit  for 
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economic operators(investment for the most part). This finding also casts some shadow on the 
mainstream measurement of financial development in the finance-investment nexus(Xu,2000; 
Rousseau  &  Vuthipadadorn,2005;  Misati  &  Nyamongo,2010).  In  Xu(2000)  for  instance 
financial depth is the sole measurement of financial development. While the paper establishes 
a ‘finance led investment’ nexus, perhaps more dynamics with relevant policy implications 
might have cropped-up had alternative measures of finance been employed. 
Specifically for domestic investment, our findings confirm those of Ndikumana(2005) 
who posits that financial intermediary efficiency leads to investments via changes in output. 
That is, reduction in financial intermediation cost(financial efficiency) depends on output for 
changes in domestic investment. Hence to our query of whether financial reforms could raise 
the African continent to investment prominence in the 21st century, we could optimistically 
assert  from the  weight  of  available  empirical  evidence  that,  allocation  efficiency targeted 
reforms could significantly improve African investment. 
Relating  the  findings  to  the  literature  in  more  detail,  the  results  on  foreign  direct 
investment are broadly consistent with Luiz & Charalambous(2009) who assert that financial 
markets service size has a positive bearing on foreign investment. Findings of this paper also 
contribute to existing literature by throwing light into the debate over financial  thresholds 
necessary for the financial benefits of foreign investment. While VECM results confirm the 
strand asserting  that  financial  benefits  of  foreign  direct  investment  are  questionable  until 
greater domestic financial development has taken place, short-run causality results are broadly 
in line with the opposing school of thought. With respect to the VECM, but for Mozambique 
in the case of financial  efficiency,  negative FDI elasticities confirm mainstream consensus 
(Henry,2007;  Kose et  al.,2011)that  the financial  benefits  of  foreign capital  flows are  less 
feasible when domestic financial dynamics are undeveloped. A recent panel data investigation 
of  this hypothesis  in the African continent has revealed that it is valid for financial depth and 
size(Asongu,2012).   Short-run causality  results  on the other  hand are in  line  with Lee  & 
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Chang(2009) and recent  African finance literature with respect to financial  efficiency and 
size(Asongu,2012). It  follows that  with respect to short-run causality results,  the financial 
benefits(especially in efficiency and  size) of foreign investment may not be contingent on 
existing levels of domestic financial development.
Four  policy  implications  result  from  the  findings.  (1)  Evidence  of  bi-directional 
causality for the most part  show that extreme caution should be taken when using single 
equation  analysis  for  economic  forecasts.  Hence  model  specifications  in  the  investment-
finance  nexus  should  be  endogeneity-robust  in  order  to  avoid  inconsistent  and  biased 
estimates  as  well  as  unhealthy  policy  recommendations  resulting  from such findings.  (2) 
Financial  development  leads  more  to  investment  flows  than  the  opposite  effect.  Hence 
governments of sampled countries should focus on financial institutional capacity building in 
order to generate investment flows rather than expect investment activities to shape financial 
institutions.  (3)  Financial  allocation  efficiency  is  more  relevant  as  means  to  attracting 
investment flows than financial depth. Hence policy measures based on money supply(depth) 
as an indicator of investment activities should be cautious on the reality that, an extensive use 
of currency may not necessarily indicate a positive investment climate.  (4) The somewhat 
heterogeneous nature of the findings also point to the fact that blanket policies should take 
into account country-specific trends in the finance-investment nexus. Hence policies will be 
more effective if they are contingent  on the prevailing finance-investment  nexus trends in 
each country. 
5) Conclusion  
This paper’s  contribution to existing literature has been  fivefold.  (1) Contrary to 
mainstream  studies,  we  have  used  four  measures  of  financial  intermediary  development 
(depth,  efficiency,  activity  and size)   as well  as four types  of investment  flows(domestic, 
foreign, portfolio and total). Hence we have broadened the scope of the investment finance 
nexus. (2) The chosen investment and financial  indicators have resulted from the broadest 
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macroeconomic dataset available on investment and financial intermediary flows. Thus based 
on correlation analyses,  conceptual frameworks and usages in the literature,  these selected 
indicators are most representative of investment  and financial flows in the African continent. 
(3)   Usage  of  optimally  specified  econometric  methods  in  contradiction  to  purely 
discretionary model specifications  in mainstream literature. (4) Distinction between short-run 
and long-run effects  for each investment-finance pair.  (5) Based on  the results,  we have 
provided some policy recommendations.
The following findings have been established. (1) Granger causality within the VAR 
and VECM frameworks is bidirectional for the most part. (2) There are appealing trends of 
short-run  dynamics:  while  finance  led  investment  elasticities  are  positive,  investment 
elasticities  of  finance  are  negative.  This  confirms  conventional  wisdom  that  financial 
development improves investment allocation.  (3) But for Guinea Bissau, Mozambique and 
Togo, finance does not seem to engender portfolio investment. (4) Contrary to mainstream 
literature, financial efficiency appears to impact investment more than does financial depth. 
Four  policy  implications  have  resulted  from  the  findings.  (1)  Evidence  of  bi-
directional causality for the most part  shows that extreme caution should be taken when using 
single   equation  analysis  for  economic  forecasts.  Hence  model  specifications  in  the 
investment-finance nexus should be endogeneity-robust in a  bid to avoid inconsistent  and 
biased estimates as well as unhealthy policy recommendations resulting from such findings. 
(2) Financial  development leads more to investment flows than the opposite effect. Hence 
governments of sampled countries should focus on financial institutional capacity building in 
order to generate investment flows rather than expect investment activities to shape financial 
institutions.  (3)  Financial  allocation  efficiency  is  more  relevant  as  means  to  attracting 
investment flows than financial depth. Hence policy measures based on money supply(depth) 
as an indicator of investment activities should be cautious on the reality that an extensive use 
of currency may not necessarily indicate a positive investment climate.  (4) The somewhat 
24
heterogeneous nature of the findings also point to the fact that, blanket policies should take 
into account country-specific trends in the finance-investment nexus. Hence policies will be 
more effective if they are contingent  on the prevailing finance-investment  nexus trends in 
each country. 
Appendices 
Appendix 1: Correlation analysis of  financial development variables 
                                        
                                      
                                         Correlation Matrix
                 dbacba    llgdp   cbagdp   dbagdp   pcrdbgdp  pcrdbofgdp  bdgdp  fdgdp   bcbd   
    dbacba       1.0000   0.2691   -.5197   0.4755     0.5157    0.4642   0.3809  0.3810  0.2716  
    llgdp        0.2691   1.0000   0.0992   0.8226     0.6515    0.5513   0.9435  0.9522  -.1340  
    cbagdp       -.5197   0.0992   1.0000   -.0248     -.1025    -.1122   0.0418  0.0362  -.1647  
    dbagdp       0.4755   0.8226   -.0248   1.0000     0.9302    0.8392   0.8940  0.8792  0.2541  
    pcrdbgdp     0.5157   0.6515   -.1025   0.9302     1.0000    0.9122   0.7346  0.7168  0.4592  
    pcrdbofgdp   0.4642   0.5513   -.1122   0.8392     0.9122    1.0000   0.6604  0.6582  0.3506  
    bdgdp        0.3809   0.9435   0.0418   0.8940     0.7346    0.6604   1.0000  0.9915  -.1297  
    fdgdp        0.3810   0.9522   0.0362   0.8792     0.7168    0.6582   0.9915  1.0000  -.1459  
    bcbd         0.2716   -.1340   -.1647   0.2541     0.4592    0.3506   -.1297  -.1459  1.0000  
Source(author)
Where: dbacba(Deposit Money Bank Assets/(Deposit Money + Central  Bank Assets))
             llgdp(Liquid Liabilities/ GDP)
             cbagdp(Central Bank Assets/GDP)
             dbagdp(Deposit Money Bank Assets/GDP)
             pcrdbgdp(Private Credit by Deposit Money Banks/GDP)
             bdgdp(Bank Deposits/GDP)
             fdgp(Financial System Deposit/GDP)
             bcbd(Bank Credit/Bank Deposits)
             pcrdbofgdp(Private Credit by Deposit Money Banks and Other Financial     Institutions/GDP)
Appendix 2: Correlation analysis  of investment/financial flows 
                                        Correlation Matrix
                                                       
          FDI   PCF   MRI   NODA GPriI  GPubI  GFCF  GDI   OCF  NLTB   PFI   PFEF  Bi   NFI   TGDS
    FDI   1.00  0.98  0.34  -.01  0.49  0.21  0.51  0.50  -.09  0.02  -.08  -.07  0.31  0.08  -.14
    PCF   0.98  1.00  0.34  -.03  0.49  0.20  0.50  0.50  -.09  0.03  0.10  0.05  0.30  0.08  -.14
    MRI   0.34  0.34  1.00  0.22  0.51  0.44  0.65  0.63  0.05  -.02  -.02  -.05  0.48  0.06  -.76
    NODA  -.01  -.03  0.22  1.00  -.13  0.39  0.09  0.05  -.12  0.02  -.07  -.15  0.27  0.08  -.46
    GPriI 0.49  0.49  0.51  -.13  1.00  0.11  0.84  0.81  -.023 -.03  0.01  0.03  0.38  0.06  -.15
    GPubI 0.21  0.20  0.45  0.39  0.11  1.00  0.59  0.60  -.04  -.03  -.07  -.15  0.64  0.19  -.31
    GFCF  0.51  0.50  0.65  0.09  0.84  0.59  1.00  0.97  -.03  -.03  -.03  -.06  0.64  0.16  -.29
    GDI   0.50  0.49  0.63  0.05  0.81  0.57  0.96  1.00  -.03  -.03  -.01  -.05  0.62  0.09  -.24
    OCF   -.09  -.09  0.05  -.12  -.03  -.04  -.03  -.03  1.00  -.16  0.04  0.06  -.04  -.03  -.02
    NLTB  0.02  0.03  -.02  0.02  -.03  -.03  -.03  -.03-  .16  1.00  0.02  0.00  -.00  -.01  -.01
    PFI   -.08  0.09  -.02  -.07  0.01  -.07  -.03  -.01  0.04  0.02  1.00  0.71  -.05  0.01  0.02
    PFEF  -.07  0.05  -.05  -.15  0.03  -.15  -.06  -.05  0.06  0.00  0.71  1.00  -.10  0.02  0.07
    Bi    0.31  0.30  0.48  0.27  0.38  0.64  0.64  0.62  -.04  -.00  -.05  -.10  1.00  0.13  -.23
    NFI   0.08  0.08  0.06  0.08  0.06  0.19  0.16  0.09  -.03  -.01  0.01  0.02  0.13  1.00  -.03
    TGDS  -.14  -.14  -.76  -.46  -.16  -.31  -.29  -.24  -.02  -.01  0.02  0.06  -.23  -.03  1.00
Source(author)
Where:
FDI(Foreign Direct Investment/GDP)
PCF(Private Capital Flows/GDP)
MRI(Remittance Inflows/GDP)
NODA(Net Development Assistance/GDP)
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GPriI(Gross Private Investment/GDP)
GPubI(Gross Public  Investment/GDP)
GFCF(Gross Fixed Capital Formation/GDP)
GDI(Gross Domestic Investment/GDP)
NLTB(Net Long Term Borrowing)
PFI(Portfolio Investment/GDP)
PFEF(Portfolio Equity Flows/GDP)
BI(Budgetary Investment/GDP)
NFI(Net Foreign Investment/GDP)
TGDS(Total Gross Domestic Savings)
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